Illicit sharing of infringing content, such as movies and TV, remains a persistent and ongoing threat to the viability of Australia's creative industries. The revenue model that underpins torrent indexing and file locker sites which enable this sharing -like much of the World Wide Web -is based on advertising. Recent research has suggested that there has been a shift from mainstream to High-Risk advertising on these sites. In this study, advertising targeting Australians was analysed from the Top 500 Google-upheld DMCA complaints for movies and TV distributed by major Hollywood studios, with 10 sites from each complaint sampled for all ads displayed. It was found that only one site carried mainstream advertising with ads targeting Australian consumers. The policy implications of this result and future research directions, including methodology enhancements, are discussed.
Introduction
Online advertising has a 20 year long history (Medoff, 2000) , progressing from simple ad banners displayed on a fixed rotation schedule, through to personalised, behavioural advertising networks, which use profiles of individual users to present the most "relevant" advertisements (McStay, 2011) . Such technologies make extensive use of "tracking cookies" (Watters, 2012) and the linkages between advertising networks and cookies have recently been monitored and explored for the most popular websites in Australia (Herps et al, submitted) . The most interesting result from this study was that the number of cookies stored on a user's computer from any of the Top 50 most-visited sites for Australians ranged between 0 and 86. The sophistication and the extent to which user behaviour is tracked and experiences customised is only going to increase over time, as is the overall volume of advertising. Indeed, in 2012, online advertising spending in the US reached US$39.6b, exceeding the amount spent on traditional print advertising for the first time (eMarketer, 2012) .
Furthermore, some companies are in a unique position to know "everything" about their customers. Google, for example, has the capacity to monitor almost all of the world's information, including personal emails, YouTube movies, Android phones, news services, images, shopping, blogs and so on (Cleland, 2013) . Through its acquisition of Doubleclick, Google controlled an estimated 69% of the online advertising market (Browser Media, 2008) , however, the rise of social media advertising (especially through Facebook) has seen this reduce to 56% (Womack, 2013) . Clearly, there is a potential confluence of capability and opportunity to maximise the number of "eyeballs" exposed to online ads.
What are the implications of this massive rise in advertising expenditure, which coincides with an increased ability for online advertising networks to be able to best "place" ads to suit specific customers? One particular type of website -those associated with file sharing of infringing content -appears to have wholeheartedly embraced advertising. Indeed, advertising revenues provide the commercial motivation for criminal syndicates to operate such 'rogue' web sites. While the connection between film piracy and organised crime has been explored elsewhere, in terms of direct revenues (Treverton et al, 2009) , there has been far less publicity about the advertising revenues generated from sites that appear to offer infringing content for free, or at least, offer torrents that enable users to download such material. Certainly, the links between the underground economy and the internet have been criticised for facilitating sexual exploitation and human trafficking through organised crime -in the classic paper in this field, Hughes (2000) highlighted how global advertising and marketing of prostitution have led to increases in volume globally. Furthermore, Hughes identified that a lack of regulation of internet advertising was the key policy failure in preventing harm to women and children.
The Pirate Bay is one of the most popular sites for providing torrents to infringing content, and has been the subject of criminal proceedings against its operators in Sweden. In the 2009 trial of its operators, their expenses were estimated to be US$110,000 (Olsson, 2006; Kuprianko, 2009) , with advertising revenues in the order of US$1.4m (Sundberg, 2009 ) -in other words, an extremely profitable business with gross margins of 1272%! A recent study (Detica, 2012) indicated that there are six different business models operating within the pirate site marketplace, ranging from advertisement and donation funding, through to subscriptions and freemium sites, where subscribers can gain faster access to illicit content by paying a subscription fee. 83% of the sites in that study operated using a central website. Selling advertising on file locker and torrent search sites is the major source of revenue for such sites. The Pirate Bay, for example, regularly features in the Top 50 sites accessed by Australians (as computed by alexa.com) , and so it is a potentially attractive space for advertisers and ad networks, since the number of potential "eyeballs" is very high. Maximising "eyeballs" leads to clicking, which drives revenue for the ad networks (if they operate a Pay Per Click revenue model), and sales for the advertisers. A key question for advertisers and ad networks is the extent to which they wish to be associated with this type of activity; indeed, due to the complex algorithms which decide which ads to display to which users, advertisers may not be aware of every site that their ads are being displayed on.
Being able to quantify the scale of advertising on these sites is important, since informing and making advertisers aware of the integrity of the sites on which their ads are being displayed can then be undertaken. Advertisers will thus be able to make more informed choices about their use of online advertising networks (the companies who provide aggregation of space on web sites) who are supporting piracy by selling ad space on torrent and file locker sites. A recent set of best practice guidelines for ad networks to address piracy and counterfeiting have recently been released 1 , and early indications are that most of the world's major web companies will participate 2 . There have been few systematic studies investigating the relationship between piracy and advertising, and most have been concerned with the impact of interventions to reduce piracy. For example, Sheehan et al (submitted) identified that increasing the perception of legal risk for college students was most likely to influence downloading behaviour, while Gopal et al (2009) weighed up the ethical predispositions of downloaders and their beliefs in justice and law to the money potentially saved by downloading infringing content. Indeed, it is this appeal to justice as the primary virtue of social behaviour (Rawls, 1999) that may concern ethical advertisers if their advertising expenditure was being used to fund illicit activities.
Recently, the USC Annenberg Lab has begun producing a report that explores the relationship between piracy sites and online advertising networks (Taplin, 2013) . The USC report provides a method for revealing the advertisers whose ads are most likely to be served up on these sites, which may be occurring without the direct knowledge of the advertiser. While the objectives of USC research are significant, the monthly rankings of the "top ten" advertising networks responsible for placing the most ads on web sites that support infringing content are 1 http://2013ippractices.com/bestpracticesguidelinesforadn etworkstoaddresspiracyandcounterfeiting.html 2 http://torrentfreak.com/tech-giants-sign-deal-to-banadvertising-on-pirate-websites-130715/ surprisingly variable -Google, for example, was ranked at #2 in January 2013, but did not appear at all in the February and March 2013 lists at all. One interpretation of the result could be that the January report achieved its goal of sensitising advertising networks, and that Google subsequently withdrew from placing ads on those sites. Alternatively, the variation could be due to biases inherent in studies using an observational methodology, including:
• Selection bias, in the way that infringing sites are selected. The study uses a single source (the Google Transparency Report of domains with the most DMCA takedown requests), rather than using a consensus technique which combines the ranks of several different data sources to provide the most accurate ranking. This type of triangulation is commonly used in observational studies as a form of triangulation;
• Information bias, since only one technique for collecting data is used (HTML and JavaScript code scraping), where other techniques may be more accurate or representative of advertising behaviour. For example, persistent cookies have been strongly associated with behavioural advertising, and the frequency of tracking cookies being stored by ad networks could provide an alternative measure of presence of significance. Yet the USC report does not analyse cookies at all; and
• Recall bias, since the data analysed was only from English-language websites and advertising networks which may potentially have a higher level of visibility than networks which operate in other geographic zones, languages, encoding types etc Also, the lack of detail in how measures like the "top 500" sites prevent the study results from being directly replicated, which would be the standard required for peer review by other researchers. By not providing this level of detail, the credibility of the USC report may be called into question by the very vocal critics of any research in the anti-piracy field.
In this paper, we present a more rigorous and fully replicable methodology which should provide a much clearer view of advertising network behaviour in different countries, jurisdictions, languages etc. In this initial study, we specifically target Australian users content produced and distributed by major Hollywood Studios; the methodology itself is sufficiently general that it could be applied to any country and any category, including music, computer games, e-books etc.
Methods
The main goal of the methodology is to identify the advertising networks and advertisers from a sample of DMCA complaints, which have been ranked in terms of the number of complaints upheld by Google (through their Transparency Report). These complaints typically relate to the availability of search results for a wide range of potentially infringing content; by only selecting the most complained about and subsequently upheld complaints as assessed by a third-party (Google), the results should be robust against criticisms that there is no proof that the sites in question were hosting torrents of infringing content or infringing content directly, in the case of a file locker site. The methodology operates by downloading each page from the "top 500" complaints submitted to Google within the previous month, ordered by the number of upheld complaints. Since each DMCA notice can contain many thousands of individual URLs, a sampling procedure can be used to identify a representative subset of URLs, and the advertisements on each page can be downloaded along with their metadata. In the case of simple banner ads, it is then relatively easy to identify the advertisers concerned; in the case of each distinct advertisement, a rule can be generated using SQL or similar to identify all advertisements with the same metadata. However, some advertising networks use JavaScript obfuscation and a series of redirects to obscure the ultimate destination for the advertising banner; in this case, manual inspection must be performed, in the absence of a general purpose image/logo recognition system. The overall prevalence of a particular advertiser on each network can be then be computed and ordered by frequency.
Furthermore, it may be of interest to separate out "mainstream" advertisements as opposed to "High-Risk" advertising, since the Annenberg reports indicate a flight by mainstream advertising this year from sites that host infringing content. Advertisers who may otherwise be unable to place their ads on a mainstream site can then take advantage of increasing "eyeballs" by occupying display space. Results are thus reported for the High-Risk and mainstream categories, with the former including categories such as:
• The algorithm works as follows: 1. A data collection system is installed physically or logically to attract advertising for a specific geographical/country segment. For this study, Australia was selected.
2.
The current Google Transparency Report 3 is downloaded, which lists all of the DMCA requests for the previous month. This list provides one means of identifying sites involved in sharing pirated material.
3. The dataset is sorted by the number of URLs removed, retaining the "top 500" DMCA requests (the request list) by complaint category. For this study, the complaint category was movies and TV shows; other complaint categories such as pirated software, adult material, music etc were excluded.
4. For each report in the request list first 10 URLs are extracted as a representative sample of all of the URLs contained within the report. This gives a total of 5,000 web pages to be downloaded (the sample).
5. Each of the 5,000 web pages in the sample is downloaded, and a screenshot is taken, showing the ads being served. Note that pop-up ads are not captured.
6. For each web page in the sample, the code blocks that contain advertising are parsed and extracted. This can be achieved by matching against the Easy List 4 (used by Adblock Plus for filtering), for known URL patterns and hostnames of advertisers. Some pages in the sample will have no ads, while others will have multiple ads.
7.
For each advertising code block, the domain of the advertising network being used is identified, by stripping extraneous code and links from the code block, and counting the frequency of appearance of each ad network domain.
8. For each identified advertisement, an attempt is made to identify the actual advertiser, by analysing metadata, following the link and extracting the domain of the actual advertiser, or through visual inspection. A list of all identified advertisers is then generated.
9. For all "mainstream" advertising networks identified as present on web page, a further 100 samples of advertising are downloaded and added to any unseen advertisers to the identified list.
Definitions
 Internet Advertising. Ads are typically placed as "banners" on a website, which direct a user to another site when clicked. The contents of the ad are similar to a highway billboard, except that the can incorporate interactive elements such as animation. Ads on the same page are often rotated through a predetermined or random sequence, depending on the advertising plan that an advertiser has subscribed to. While some sites host and manage their own banners, most often, these are managed by a third-party advertising network. These ad networks act as an intermediary between an advertiser and many hundreds, thousands or millions of sites, allowing an advertiser to increase their reach to potential consumers while only dealing with a single agency. (Cameron, 2013) .  Rogue Site. A website which provides an index and search capability for torrents of infringing content, a "file locker" site which provides hosting for such material, or a "link site" which provides direct links to content on third party sites. The primary motivation for users visiting these websites is to access infringing content. These sites can all use advertising as either primary or secondary sources of income.
Results
After analysing the TV and movie DMCA reports from major Hollywood studios such as Fox, Warner Bros etc, only one site from the sample was found to be hosting mainstream advertising; all other sites were only hosting High-Risk advertising. From the 5,000 pages analysed in
Step 4, a total of 12,638 distinct advertising blocks were identified in Step 6, giving an average 2.5276 ads per page. Postprocessing of the identified domains were performed to ensure that all ad blocks were correctly identified, for example, by removing port numbers that were included as part of a URL. 351 unique domains for advertising networks were identified, indicating an average 36.01 ads per network in the sample (keeping in the mind that the distribution -shown in Table 1 's Top 10 advertising networks -is non-uniform). Note that no merging of distinct services was performed, eg, the several domains of The Pirate Bay were not aggregated. Also, where a domain appears within an ad block, this is a technical definition as per the methodology in Steps 6 and 7, ie, if the site or known ad URL appears in the block, then it will be counted. This could include Facebook social plugins, for example, rather than Facebook ads. 
High-Risk Advertising-Top 10 Ad Networks
The results for the breadth-first search (step 8) confirm that there are still mainstream advertisers prepared to support the distribution of infringing content. One exception was noted -while many of the file locker sites visited had no advertising slots at all, they were offering subscription packages of up to two years or pay-per-view packages for single titles. Others appeared to rely on both advertising and membership: eg, isohunt.com charges $1 per month for premium membership, as well as hosting ads.
Where advertising was hosted on torrent and file locker sites, it sometimes fell squarely into what can only 5 Note that some ad networks like isohunt.com and sumotorrent.com do not display their ads outside their own domain; they are ranked highly because of the high number of DMCA complaints against their site be described typically adv 
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to develop a systematic approach to analysing internet advertising, with a focus specifically on sites where DMCA complaints about movie and TV content were upheld by Google. The key findings from the analysis of the first Australian data set are discussed below: • 99% of the ads were High-Risk; only 1% were mainstream.
• Only one site from the sample displayed only mainstream advertising; the remaining sites either had no ads or displayed only ads from High-Risk sources, or had a small number of mainstream ads.
• In the High-Risk ads, 46.49% were for malicious or suspected malicious code, while 20.18% were for the sex industry. A further 14.91% were for scams of various kinds, including premium rate SMS, investment and employment scams.
• The top ad networks serving ads to Australians include propellerads.com, adexprt.com and fhserve.com; while these may seem less mainstream, as the above results indicate, many ads from mainstream "household names" are being promoted through this means of advertising exclusively on 1 out of 500 sites in the sample, and a small number non-exclusively.
• Both breadth-first and depth-first searches reveal a significant number of household name brands in Australia choosing to advertise on sites and their pages which are promoting the distribution of infringing content (movies and TV shows). Further investigation is needed to uncover the mechanics of how these ads are selected to appear; are advertisers engaging directly with ad networks, or are ad networks operating at a wholesale level and distributing ads to other networks through a resale programme? Who, eventually, has control over the display of this type of advertising space? • In the breadth-first search, top mainstream advertisers included Kia, Optus, ANZ Bank and Suncorp Bank.
• In the depth-first search, top mainstream advertisers were drawn from every sector in the Australian economy, including gambling companies (NSW Lotteries), car manufacturers (Mitsubishi), financial services (Commonwealth Bank), travel insurance (Travel Insurance Direct), health insurance (AHM), accommodation (Marriott Hotels), charity (RUOK Day), and optometrists (Clearly Contacts). Drawing together these findings, some key lessons can be drawn:
• Advertisers need to take more ownership of where their advertising is ultimately displayed by negotiating better agreements -based around integritywith their ad networks. Rather than further government regulation, establishing a code of conduct (such as the US industry is doing) would be a first step (Dredge, 2013) . A set of best practices to be adopted by major web companies would even further isolate rogue websites, and ultimately, reduce the advertising revenue which in turns drives their ability to promote infringing content. Facebook has recently responded to pressure from its advertisers to remove links to pages with offensive material under threat of a boycott (Cellan-Jones, 2013 ). In addition, Google recently acted to remove search results for pharmaceuticals without prescriptions (O'Donnell, 2013) , after paying a $500 million fine 18 months previously. A recent study (Watters & Phair, 2012) indicated that the illicit drug trade is a growing problem online, as advertising to new customers is fast, easy, affordable and low risk, given that jurisdictional differences can be exploited by transnational organised crime. Rather than individual advertising networks responding on an ad-hoc basis, an industry wide code will ensure a consistent response across the board with a focus on integrity in advertising.
• However, any code of conduct must also be enforceable, be aimed at disrupting revenue streams for rogue sites, and not place a significant administrative burden on rightsholders. Another risk is that there will continue to be a shift of mainstream advertising away from rogue sites, and that High-risk advertising networks will simply fill the gap. Indeed, at this stage, none of the top 10 advertising networks supporting rogue websites are involved in the code of conduct project 6 .
• Advertisers clearly need more transparency from ad networks about where their ads are being displayed, as most (if not all) would no doubt be very surprised about where their ads are being displayed. The potential for brand damage in enormous. In some cases, company names are also being employed without knowledge (eg, a number of Woolworths and Westfield $1,000 voucher ads were displayed on scam sites). To provide operational assurance, advertisers should implement systems to monitor the usage of their brand names and trademarks on unauthorised sites. Existing brand protection services for corporates clearly need to consider the negative implications for mainstream advertisements appearing alongside the "scam" categories outlined earlier, as well as advertisers appearing to endorse the illegal distribution of infringing content.
• Future research should focus on developing better techniques for identifying sites hosting mainstream advertising on sites hosting infringing content, and then passing these across to more robust systems for extracting advertiser names. This is because many advertising networks use JavaScript obfuscation to try and hide the domain name and other identifying details of the advertisers. Short of implementing generic image recognition for brand names and logos, semi-supervised learning of patterns accompanied by expert judgements will provide the most accurate results over the short term.
• Finally, and perhaps most importantly, parents and educators need to be aware of that the sex industry and online gambling sites specifically target torrent search and file locker sites for advertising their services. Ads promoting scams, the sex industry and gambling compromised 37.72% of the ads examined. For example, upon visiting the "Top 100" page for the Pirate Bay, one employment scam was displayed ( "I make $260 every day") and one porn site ("Facebook of webcams"). However, upon clicking the "Porn" page, an animated sex ad is displayed ("LOCAL SLUTS WANT TO F**K. Why the F**K would you pay for sex? Sign Up and F**K"). There are absolutely no age warnings on these pages, and no attempt is made by the Pirate Bay to verify if users are adults. Parents need to be aware that this is the type of content that will be served up to their children, even if they are only intending to download torrent for music or less offensive content. The absence of traditional regulatory mechanisms for effectively controlling online content -including the Classification Board and Advertising Standards Bureau -mean that new subcultural norms are rapidly being established online, and these can have profoundly negative consequences; for example, a progression model of rising interest in child exploitation material has been linked to the rise of the online porn culture, particularly where young users are inadvertently exposed to pornography through advertising (Prichard et al, 2013) .
